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Abstract
This paper estimates the impact of increases in the minimum wage on employment 
stability, wages and inequality in Portugal. We use data from 2002 to 2010; from 
2002 to 2006 the real minimum wage was stable, but it increased quite substantially 
afterwards. Lower-tail wage inequality widen up to 2006 and declined strongly 
afterwards. The results point towards a negative employment elasticity for workers 
whose initial wage is between the old and the new minimum wages. This elasticity 
is similar to the one obtained in the US, a country with a low minimum wage when 
compared to the average wage, and smaller than the one obtained for France, a 
country with a high minimum wage. The wage elasticity to the minimum wage is 
naturally higher for workers earning exactly the old minimum wage. The wages of 
all other workers remain unaffected. These results point to a detrimental effect of 
minimum wage increases for employment stability of low-wage workers, with only 
minor gains in terms of wages.
1. Introduction
Policy makers and economists often lead long debates on relevant issues for people’s life. The minimum 
wage is one of the most debated topics in labor economics. The arguments on the minimum wage policy 
consider its impact on employment, wages and the distribution of income.
Economists know since the seminal work of Stigler (1946) that the minimum wage can have a positive 
impact on employment. They also know, but for a longer period, that the minimum wage can have a 
negative impact on employment. While the latter is probably the most expected result – after all nobody 
contests that we typically reduce the consumption of apples when its price goes up – the former is also 
a plausible outcome. Indeed, in markets where an employer (demand) has a signiﬁ  cant market power 
and is able to control the wage that he pays, a legal imposition of a minimum wage may increase the 
level of employment. The employer has “monopsony power”, which allows him to pay wages below 
the workers’ marginal productivity. Thus, in a situation where the government increases the wage paid 
(but not above productivity), the employer still has the incentive to keep the worker. What is more, 
the higher wage attracts to the labor supply workers otherwise idle. Overall, the minimum wage may 
increase employment. But in a market where the minimum wage increase eats away the proﬁ  t margin, 
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sthe impact on employment is perverse. Ultimately, the sign of the impact of the minimum wage on 
employment is an empirical question.
The main political goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute income to low-paid workers. To achieve 
this goal most policies incur in several risks. First, the minimum wage increase takes money away from 
some citizens and pays it to others. In doing this, national output does not increase (except for monopsony 
markets). Does the money reach its target? Probably not, since rises in the minimum wage may reduce 
low-wage employment. Second, the minimum wage policy is an exogenous interference with the ﬁ  rm’s 
human resources management. It changes the relative price of workers inside the ﬁ  rm, making those 
relatively better paid relatively less expensive. This may drive employment away from minimum-wage 
earners, but may also result in a signiﬁ  cant compression of the wage distribution – lower wage increases 
for wages just above the minimum. As a result, internal labor market characteristics of the ﬁ  rm that 
deliver positive economic outcomes in terms of productivity, such as returns to tenure, long spells of 
employment and ports-of-entry may be negatively impacted.
The motivation to change the minimum wage can also rest on other types of arguments. We can use 
efﬁ  ciency wage arguments. The level of the minimum wage is interpreted as the lowest level of wages 
compatible with a given living standard and a fair level of payment in exchange for the services of labor. 
This can also be supplied with a Keynesian ﬂ  avor, if we believe that higher wages provide the economy 
with stronger demand and thus increase the overall output level. Additionally, there may be some general 
equilibrium effects coming from higher levels of the minimum wage, which may lead ﬁ  rms to create 
more productive jobs, therefore better paid and workers to demand these types of jobs.
In this study, we analyze the impact of minimum wage policy on low wage earners between 2002 and 
2010. This is a quite interesting period in Portugal because a period of no real gains in the minimum wage 
up to 2006 is followed by a period of quite substantial increase in the minimum wage. In this context, 
it is interesting to analyze the impact of the minimum wage on low-wage workers and not only on the 
minimum-wage earners. We will address the following questions: Does the minimum wage help to reduce 
lower tail wage inequality? Are there employment losses associated with increases in the minimum wage 
above the average wage increase? Is there a spillover effect from minimum wage increases?
To answer these questions, we estimate a set of models to establish the relationship between minimum 
wages increases and employment, conditional on a set of characteristics prevailing in the economy at 
that time. In particular, we study how the interaction of the real minimum wage variation and the worker 
position in the distribution of wages affects the probability that (s)he remains employed.
Research consensus for other countries seems to evolve around the following conclusion: the impact on 
employment is a debate around zero (Freeman, 1996). The minimum wage seems to have some impact 
on the wage distribution, but a much smaller impact (if any) on the income distribution (for a detailed 
discussion see Brown, 1999, Card and Krueger, 1995 and Neumark and Wascher, 2007). In any case, 
the initial level and the dimension of the increase in the minimum wage seem to be relevant to set the 
case. Low increases in the minimum wage are certainly much more employment friendly. What would 
be difﬁ  cult after that is to deﬁ  ne what a “low increase” is.
Our results conﬁ  rm this general appraisal. The later and larger updates of the minimum wage lead to 
signiﬁ  cant reductions in lower-tail wage inequality. This compression of wages was both explained 
by signiﬁ  cant wage increases in the lower percentiles and below average increases at median wages. 
However, they are also associated with signiﬁ  cant decreases in employment. A less intrusive minimum 
wage policy is thus advisable. Adding to this conclusion, it is widely known that workers and job turnover 
are higher for low-wage workers. The resulting excess worker turnover coming from increased employ-
ment instability as a result of minimum wage increases is widely detrimental for productivity, training 


























































In this article we use a longitudinal database matching workers and ﬁ  rms made available by Instituto 
de Informática da Segurança Social (Portuguese social security data processing ofﬁ  ce), which includes 
all workers who paid contributions to the social security general regime, covering the period from 2002 
to 2010. Workers and ﬁ  rms have a unique identiﬁ  cation code that allows tracking both over time. One 
of the advantages of using this information is the administrative nature of the database – registers of 
mandatory contributions to the Portuguese social security system. Usually, the information in adminis-
trative databases is seen as more reliable, being less prone to measurement errors, such as reporting or 
rounding errors, particularly in wages.
The information on wages refers to gross monthly values, reported in October of each year. The database 
includes different types of compensation, namely permanent, variable, vacation and Christmas bonuses, 
and other pay. To increase comparability, we used the permanent wage adjusted for a ﬁ  xed work period 
of 30 days, i.e. we divided the permanent compensation by the actual number of days worked in the 
month and multiplied by 30.
In addition to wages and the number of days worked in October, this database also includes other vari-
ables, such as job tenure and variables related to workers (for example, gender, age and worker status 
– employees, self-employed or other) and ﬁ  rms’ characteristics (for instance, region and size), covering 
all activity sectors. The coverage in public administration, health and education has been increasing over 
time, as new civil servants are enrolled in the social security general regime, instead of the speciﬁ  c civil 
servant social security scheme.
The original database was restricted to salaried workers, whose wage was at least 80 per cent of the 
minimum wage established by law (taking into account the legal possibility of a 20 per cent reduction 
in minimum wages earned by apprentices and trainees). Furthermore, inconsistent and missing reports 
on gender, age and job tenure were dropped. So, our sample has almost 25 million year/worker/ﬁ  rm 
observations, an average of 2.7 million workers in each year.
3. The evolution of minimum wage in Portugal: 2002-2010
The Portuguese minimum wage legislation was introduced in 1974, deﬁ  ning the legal minimum wage 
for employees with at least 20 years of age, excluding agriculture, domestic work and ﬁ  rms with up to 
5 workers. Since then, this legislation has undergone several adjustments and currently there are no 
exceptions by age, activity sector or ﬁ  rm size. The minimum wage is the same for all employees except 
apprentices and trainees (whose minimum wage can be reduced by 20 per cent) and disabled workers 
(reductions between 10 and 50 per cent).
In 2002 the minimum wage was 348 euros, representing 50.3 per cent of the mean wage and 70 per 
cent of the median wage. In 2010 the minimum wage had increased to 475 euros, which represent 
52.2 per cent of the mean wage and 73.1 per cent of the median wage.1 Developments in the minimum 
wages have been discretionary, not following a formal rule or indexation – each year the government, 
after consulting representatives of workers and employers, proposes a new ﬁ  gure for the minimum 
wage. Nevertheless, the rate of change of the minimum wage has typically tracked the expected inﬂ  a-
tion, resulting in changes of the real minimum wage close to zero. In Chart 1, we can see that this was 
the case in the period from 2002 to 2006. 
This situation changed from 2007 onwards, a period during which the minimum wage increased mark-
edly in real terms (Chart 1). These recent increases reﬂ  ected the agreement signed by the government 
1  The median of a distribution represents the value for which 50 per cent of the observations are below (and, 










sand the representatives of workers and employers, in December 2006. The main goal of this agreement 
was to have a minimum wage of 500 euros by 2011. The agreed roadmap, put in place up to 2010, set 
the minimum wage at 403 euros in 2007, 426 euros in 2008, 450 euros in 2009 and 475 euros in 2010.
As shown in Chart 2, up to 2006 the growth of the minimum wage in real terms was quite similar to 
the median wage, for all employees who stayed for at least two consecutive years in the database (in 
the same ﬁ  rm or not), being, on average, about 1.8 percentage points below the growth rate of the 
mean wage. In real terms, since 2007 the minimum wage increased more sharply than the median wage, 
outpacing the mean wage in the period from 2008 to 2010.2
The evolution of the share of minimum wage earners (Chart 3) can be split in two distinct periods: (i) 
from 2002 to 2006 this share remained fairly stable, around 8 per cent; (ii) since 2007 the share of 
minimum wage earners increased markedly, from 8.9 per cent in 2007 to 12.4 per cent in 2010. This 
evolution was common to most activity sectors, being more striking in manufacturing and construction.3
The impact of the minimum wage growth can also be seen through the distributions of wages and 
wage changes. A simple visual inspection reveals that the minimum wage is a key factor in the wage 
distribution, being the mode of the distribution (Chart 4).4
Moreover, the percentile up to which the minimum wage is binding increased. While, on average, from 
2002 to 2006, the minimum wage was binding up to the 10th percentile, in 2010 it was binding up to 
the 15th percentile. This means that in 2010 15 per cent of the employees had a wage lower than or 
equal to the minimum wage.
Looking at the distributions of nominal wage changes over time, the impact of the minimum wage is 
also noticeable (Chart 5). Up to 2006, these distributions showed a high concentration on zero and 
values close to the observed/expected inﬂ  ation rates (used as a reference for bargaining and minimum 
2  Real wage rates were obtained by deﬂ  ating the nominal rates of change using consumer prices.
3  To avoid slight differences due to rounding, we considered that an employee earned the minimum wage if its 
wage falls in a 2-euro interval centered on the legal minimum wage (minimum wage +/- 1 euro).
4  The mode of a distribution is the value that occurs most frequently among the sample.
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Note: Real wage rates were obtained by deﬂ  ating the nominal 
rates of change using consumer prices. 
Note: Mean and median wages obtained from Social Security 

























































IIwages). From 2007 onwards, the distribution of wage changes had three spikes - at zero, at the observed/
expected inﬂ  ation rate value and at the rate of change of the minimum wage (in 2010, the ﬁ  rst two 
spikes collapsed into a single spike, reﬂ  ecting the low positive inﬂ  ation observed in that year).
Since the minimum wage strongly inﬂ  uences the dispersion on the left tail of the wage distribution, it 
plays a signiﬁ  cant role in the evolution of wage inequality, as measured by the ratio between the wages 
in the 50th and 10th percentiles. This ratio decreased by 12.9 per cent between 2002 and 2010 (Chart 
6). After a period of increasing inequality (7.4 per cent up to 2006), the 50/10 ratio decreased by 18.9 
per cent between 2006 and 2010. This signiﬁ  cant reduction highlights the fact that wages in the 10th 
percentile (where the minimum wage was binding) grew more markedly than in the 50th percentile (i.e. 
the median). Although common to most activity sectors, this evolution was clearer in manufacturing 
and construction. 
Chart 3


















Sources: Social Security data and authors’ calculations.
Note: We considered that an employee earned the minimum wage if its wage falls in a 2-euro interval centered on the legal mini-
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sTherefore, this evidence suggests that the stronger increases in minimum wages in recent years contributed 
to reducing wage inequality. Previous studies on the role played by the minimum wage in the evolution 
of the 50/10 inequality ratio in Portugal include Cardoso (1998) and, more recently, Centeno and Novo 
(2009). For the period after 1995, the results in the latter work also suggest that the minimum wage 
(mildly) contributed to the reduction of the 50/10 ratio, especially in the case of female workers.
Answering to the question on the impact of minimum wages on wage inequality is not clear cut. This 
issue has been extensively discussed in the literature. For example, DiNardo et al. (1996) proposed a 
semiparametric procedure to analyze the effect of several factors (including changes in the minimum 
wage) over the entire wage distribution. Using data for the US, the authors found that the increase in 
the real minimum wage between 1973 and 1979 contributed to the decrease in wage inequality. Also 
for the US, Autor et al. (2010) found a small impact of the minimum wage on the lower tail inequality, 
but highlighted that this impact could go beyond the direct effect on low-wage workers, through 
spillover effects.
Does the evolution of minimum wages only affect low-wage workers? Chart 7 shows the rate of change 
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IIreal change of the minimum wage in the period analyzed).5 In 2004 the trend in wage rates over the 
wage distribution was positive. In contrast, in 2009, low-wage workers received the highest pay rises. 
This is true not only for minimum wage earners, but also for workers with wages slightly above the 
minimum wage. In turn, medium-wage workers received the lowest pay rises.
4. Results
The debate on the impact of the minimum wage on employment and, in general, in the economy and 
society, is one that will be ultimately settled by the empirical evidence. Theoretically, there are models 
in which the minimum wage may lead to a decrease in employment, but there are also models that 
imply an increase. The last decade in Portugal has been characterized by both rather meager increases 
in the minimum wage, but also by rather generous ones. It bears asking, what has been the impact of 
such political choices? To address this question, we follow a line of research developed, among other, 
by Abowd et al. (2000) and Neumark et al. (2004). We estimate a set of models that analyze how the 
interaction between the real minimum wage increases and the worker position in the distribution of 
wages determines the probability that (s)he remains employed.
It is easy to imagine that those most affected by a minimum wage increase scheduled for next year are 
the current year’s minimum wage earners themselves. However, all other individuals whose current wage 
is below next year’s minimum wage will also be directly affected, although to smaller and varying degrees 
than the minimum wage earners. All other workers will not be directly affected by the new minimum 
wage. In our model, we will consider six levels of wage earners, hypothesizing that the further away a 
worker is from the new minimum wage, the less the probability of remaining employed is affected by 
the change in the minimum wage. The six groups are: (i) the current minimum-wage earners; (ii) those 
earning more than today’s minimum wage, but below the new minimum wage; (iii) those with wages 
in the ﬁ  rst quartile, but not in the ﬁ  rst two groups; (iv)-(vi) the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles of the wage 
distribution.
5  We are implicitly assuming that the evolution of the wages in the top-25 per cent of the distribution are not 
inﬂ  uenced by changes in the minimum wage.
Chart 6 Chart 7
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Sources: Social Security data and authors’ calculations. Sources: Social Security data and authors’ calculations.
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sSince we consider the impact of a variation in next year’s minimum wage conditional on being employed 
in the current year, our estimate of the impact is a lower bound of the overall impact on the economy 
because it ignores the impact on the transition from unemployment and inactivity to employment.
Year-by-year
We start our study by considering 8 cross-sections of workers for the years of 2003 to 2010. The estima-
tion sample excludes agriculture, wages below the legal minimum wage and missing observations for 
nationality, activity sector, job tenure and ﬁ  rm size. The results of cross-section estimation are interpret-
able as long-term relationships, in that each individual represents a cohort in different stages in the life 
cycle of the labor market. Additionally, over the years the minimum wage changes were dramatically 
different, with real wage losses and large real wage gains (see Section 3). This variability, apart from year 
speciﬁ  c effects, shall reﬂ  ect itself on the different years’ impact estimates.
We consider the following simple model speciﬁ  cation:
, ik k i i k YD X u bl =+ + å
where  i Y  assumes value 1 if individual i  remains employed from year t  to  1 t +  and 0 if (s)he is no 
longer employed in  1 t + ;  , ki D , for  1,2,...,6 k = is a dummy variable that assumes value 1 if the wage in 
year t  is in one of the 6 wage categories deﬁ  ned above. The matrix X  includes variables with worker, 
ﬁ  rm and match characteristics, namely: a quadratic term in the age of the worker; gender indicator; 
foreigner indicator; sector dummies (extractive; manufacturing; construction); ﬁ  rm size dummies (small: 
1-25 workers; medium: 26-100; large: 101 or more workers); and tenure dummies (up to 6 months; 
7-12 months; 13-36 months; 37-72 months; and more than 72 months). And  i u  is a conventional error 
term. We estimated this model using both a linear probability model and a probit model. As it can be 
seen in Table 1, the results do not depend on the choice of the method, but for computational reasons 
in the remaining of the paper, we report only the results of the linear probability model.6
A Portuguese forty-year-old male, working in a large services ﬁ  rm, in 2002, with more than 6 years of 
tenure and a wage falling in the top quartile had a 95 per cent probability of remaining employed in 
2003. Relatively to such individuals in the top quartile, the group of minimum wage earners in 2002 
was 8.3 p.p. less likely to hold a job in 2003 (Table 1, column 1). In other words, the probability of non-
employment for the minimum wage earner is 13.3 per cent, i.e., 166 per cent higher than that of the 
top quartile worker. This result is not surprising in view of the evidence that low-wage workers have 
higher on-the-job rotation rates (Centeno et al, 2008). 
The following group, composed of those who earn at least the new minimum wage, was 6.5 p.p. less 
likely to be among salaried workers than top earners. The next group, which is the ﬁ  rst one not directly 
affected by the new minimum wage, is 1 p.p. more likely to remain employed than the previous group 
but almost 3 p.p. more likely than the group of minimum wage earners. The difference relative to the 
top quartile falls monotonically for the other groups. 
The remaining columns of Table 1 repeat the exercise for the 2004-2010 period. The estimates are remark-
ably stable across the years, with slightly lower probabilities of being employed in years of economic 
downturn. There is also a tenuous increase in the probability of losing employment in years where the 
real (or nominal) minimum wage increases were more signiﬁ  cant, particularly among the group of indi-
viduals earning more than the current minimum wage but less than next year’s.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note that our cross-section analysis does not account speciﬁ  cally for the variations in the real minimum 
wage; rather, it shows how the conditional probability of employment varies among the different wage 
groups. Therefore, we cannot yet attribute to those policy options the variability in employment. To address 
this issue in a more satisfying way, we extend our analysis to panel data models. We take advantage of 
our panel with 17.4 million observations of about 2.2 million individuals per year, over the 2003-2010 
period and estimate the following model using a ﬁ  rm () j  ﬁ  xed-effects estimator:
() ,, * ijt k k ijt k k ijt t ijt k YD D M W X u bj l =+ + + å
where all variables are deﬁ  ned as before and  t MW represents the variation in the real minimum wage 
in year t . The interaction term between the level of wage in year t  () , k ijt D  and the minimum wage 
variation in year  1 t +  captures the impact on the probability of remaining employed in year  1 t + at the 
different wage levels due to the minimum wage variation. Note that the speciﬁ  cation imposes the mild 
hypothesis that individuals in the top wage quartile are not affected by variations in the real minimum 
wage. Additionally, the regression model includes year ﬁ  xed-effects.
The cross-section results gave us a ﬁ  rst rough measure of how the probability of employment varies 
across the wage distribution. With panel data, we will be able to breakdown this probability in two 
factors: one factor associated with a level effect for each wage-group; and another corresponding to 
the group speciﬁ  c marginal effect, associated with to the variation in the minimum wage, which also 
captures  the change in the minimum wage level (interaction  . k ijt t DM W ´ ). The results of the estimation 
are presented in Table 2, column (1).
Interpreting the results is not straightforward, given the existence of interaction variables in the model. 
The impact of changes in the minimum wage is captured through the  k b  and  k j  parameters. The ﬁ  rst 
parameter captures the level effect, while the second is associated with the marginal effect. In order to 
allow a direct interpretation of the ﬁ  rst impact, the variable that measures the change in the minimum 
wage was re-centered to the sample average (2 per cent). Thus, the level impact,  k b , should be seen as 
the one that corresponds to a change in the minimum wage equal to the sample average. The marginal 
impact,  k j , is not affected by this transformation and has always a direct interpretation.
For workers earning less than next year minimum wage (the two ﬁ  rst groups) the probability of remaining 
employed decreases by about 0.5 p.p. for each percentage point of increase in the minimum wage. For 
instance, in 2009, where the real minimum wage increased 6.6 per cent, the probability of remaining 
employed for a minimum wage earner decrease by (an additional) 2.6 p.p.. Overall, in 2009, minimum-
wage earners had a probability of remaining employed of 9.8 p.p. lower than a top quartile worker. This 
is decomposed in 7.2 p.p. associated with the level impact evaluated at the average increase for the real 
minimum wage, and 2.6 p.p. due to the marginal impact because the real minimum wage increased 
above the average rate. The cross-section estimation indicated a difference of 8.6 p.p.. The remaining 
wage groups, despite not being directly affected by the new minimum wage, still have slightly lower 
probabilities, around 0.2 p.p. less for each percentage point increase in the real minimum wage.
We conclude that all groups of workers are to some extent affected by the minimum wage. But, are 
there differences between them? In other words, are the coefﬁ  cient estimates statistically different from 
each other? We run hypothesis testing for the equality of the impact on the ﬁ  rst group of individuals 
earning more than next year’s minimum wage to the two groups below next year’s minimum wage. In 
both cases, we reject the hypothesis of equality, suggesting that the minimum wage is naturally more 
binding for low-wage earners.
Our results are closer to those obtained for the US and the UK than for France. In particular, Currie and 

























































IIof -0.6. The elasticities estimated by Abowd et al. (2000) are slightly larger for the US, but clearly larger 
for France (their estimates are close to -0.6 and -2.1, respectively). Machin et al. (2003) study the impact 
of the introduction of the minimum wage in the UK and ﬁ  nd also a small impact on employment. The 
evidence gathered for Portugal is ambiguous. Using a legislative reform that raised the minimum wage 
for workers aged 15 to 19 years, Portugal and Cardoso (2006) show that it resulted in a larger reduction 
of separations than in hirings. Using the same reform, Pereira (2003) reports a reduction in employment 
among such workers. The estimated employment-minimum wage elasticities of Pereira (2003) are in the 
interval -0.2 to -0.4, slightly smaller than our estimates.
The new minimum wage imposes an exogenous constraint on ﬁ  rms. Firms must adjust their production 
process to accommodate this raise in labor costs. In doing so, they can opt for adjusting their wage bill, 
they can opt for adjusting the quantity of labor (number of workers and hours worked) or a combina-
tion of these. We have seen that ﬁ  rms adjust downwards the amount of labor. Now, we explore how 
the wages of the different workers are adjusted. We use the same speciﬁ  cation (equation (2)), changing 
only the dependent variable to the log difference between the real wage in year t+1 and in year t. Table 
2, column (2), reports the estimates of the percent impact on the wage growth for the same group of 
workers relatively to the top quartile.
The ﬁ  rst noticeable fact is that the marginal impact of a percentage point increase in the real minimum 
wage is positive for those below next year’s minimum wage and negative for those above it. This pattern 
resembles the wave effect discussed earlier in Section 3. Indeed, Chart 8 plots these marginal effects 
and, apart from a rescaling, the shape of the curve is generally equivalent to Chart 7. This implies that 
Table 2
PANEL DATA FIRM FIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL
Employment Wages Elasticity
(1) (2) (3)=(1)/(2)
Wage group (β): 
Current minimum wage -7.21 15.80
(0.000) (0.000)
Less than next year's minimum wage -5.88 14.69
(0.000) (0.000)
More than next year's minimum wage but less than 1st quartile -4.42 12.05
(0.000) (0.000)
2nd quartile -2.56 9.22
(0.000) (0.000)
3rd quartile -1.11 5.35
(0.000) (0.000)
Percentage change in the real minimum wage times group indicators (φ):
Current minimum wage -0.56 0.52 -1.08
(0.000) (0.000)
Less than next year's minimum wage -0.45 0.09 -5.26
(0.000) (0.000)
More than next year's minimum wage but less than 1st quartile -0.26 -0.16 1.64
(0.000) (0.000)
2nd quartile -0.31 -0.06 5.23
(0.000) (0.000)
3rd quartile -0.17 -0.22 0.76
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of observations 17 377 525 14 721 929
Sources: Social Security data and authors’ calculations.
Notes: p-values in parentheses. The remaining control variables included in the model are omitted from the Table; see text for the 
full set of variables included. Conditional on a 2 percent increase in the real minimum wage, the coefﬁ  cients were multiplied by 100 
to be interpretable as the percentage change in the probability of remaining employed between two consecutive years for each level 
of the initial wage relatively to those with wages in the top quartile. For instance, with an increase of 2 per cent in the minimum 
wage, in relation to an individual with a wage in the top quartile, but otherwise equal (age, gender, industry, etc), a minimum-wage 
earner will be 7.2 p.p. less likely to remain employed in the following year. Additionally, for each percentage point of increase in the 










sincreases in the real minimum wage are not innocuous for non-minimum-wage earners. The spillover on 
the other individuals’ wages is negative, suggesting that ﬁ  rms adjust the other wage gains downwards 
to accommodate exogenous increases in the minimum wage. For those concerned with wage inequality, 
this outcome contributes towards a more uniform wage distribution. But as always, there might be too 
much of a good thing and the negative impact on employment must be also considered. Indeed, the 
negative outcome in employment may deliver a smaller (if any) decrease of income inequality. Further-
more, given the higher incidence of long-term unemployment among low-wage workers, this impact 
may even be increasing overt time.
Having studied the impact on employment and wages, we are now in conditions of computing wage 
demand elasticities. Table 2, column (3), reports the wage demand elasticities of each group (the ratio 
of the employment to wage coefﬁ  cients). The elasticity of minimum-wage earners is -1.1, indicating that 
for each percentage point increase in wages, employment decrease by slightly more than 1 p.p.. The 
elasticity among the group earning below next year’s minimum wage is strong, -5.3, resulting primarily 
from having a small wage variation due to the minimum wage and a negative impact on employment 
similar to the minimum-wage earners.
Heterogeneity: Young workers and sector of activity
It is a well-established fact in the literature that the minimum wage is more binding among low-skilled 
and young workers, those more prone to earn low wages due to lower productivity. Column (1) of Table 
3 reports the results of an identical exercise to those reported above, but considering a sub-sample of 
workers aged less than 25 years.7 Overall, the results indicate that young workers employment is more 
sensitive to variations in the real minimum wage. This is particularly true for the group earning exactly 
the current year’s minimum wage; for each percentage point increase in the minimum wage, the prob-
ability of remaining employed falls 0.74 p.p.. This is almost a third higher than the effect estimated for 
the population of workers considered (0.56). In column (2), we see that the impact on real wages of the 
minimum wage variation is similar in magnitude to the previous estimates, but it is typically statistically 
non-signiﬁ  cant for the group of individuals earning already above next year’s minimum wage. Together, 
7  The wage quartiles are re-deﬁ  ned for each of the sub-samples used.
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sthese results imply a larger (in absolute value) elasticity among young minimum wage earners (-1.3) and 
slightly lower elasticity in the contiguous group (-4.0).
Different industries have different human capital requirements. This in turn implies that workers with 
different skills allocate to each industry accordingly. In industries with lower human capital requirements, 
the prevalence of minimum-wage earners is stronger. For such ﬁ  rms, an exogenous increase in the 
minimum wage may have far stronger impacts than in an industry where there are few such workers. 
To study this possibility, we consider three sub-samples by industry type: manufacturing, construction, 
and services. Columns (4)-(12) present the estimates for the impact of the minimum wage increases on 
employment and wages.
There are three noteworthy facts to take away from this exercise. First, the larger impacts on employment 
occur in manufacturing and the smaller in the services sector. Second, in the case of manufacturing, the 
larger magnitudes, which were typically observed for the two groups below next year’s minimum wage, 
are extended to the third wage group. In other words, in manufacturing, those that stand to lose with 
a minimum wage increase are not only those that will have to be legally raised, but also those earning 
already slightly above that new legal threshold. Third, in contrast with manufacturing, in the services 
sector the larger magnitude is only observed for current minimum-wage earners.
5. Conclusion
This article discusses the impact of increases in the minimum wage on three key labor market outcomes: 
employment, wages and inequality. Our results point to negative and small elasticities of employment 
to increases in the minimum wage. The disincentives that increases in the minimum wage generate are 
small but they are economically signiﬁ  cant, especially in a period of protracted economic and produc-
tivity growth. Economic theory is used as a guide to interpret these results. The impact of increases in 
the minimum wage depends on the structure of the market, but also on the relevance of the level and 
increase in the minimum wage. 
The recent experience of the Portuguese economy provides an interesting setting to study the conse-
quences of large minimum wage increases. Indeed, this is a challenge to naïve results that extrapolate the 
results from increases of the minimum wage in speciﬁ  c groups of workers to a more general conclusion 
regarding the overall impact of minimum wage increases. In Portugal, lower-tail wage inequality fell 
sharply since 2007. We see this as a direct positive impact on the wages of low-paid individuals and an 
indirect (or spillover) negative effect on the wages of median wages, an effect that deserves attention 
in future research. However, individuals paid the minimum wage experienced a decrease in employment 
stability. The reduced probability of employment is a negative outcome, which may result from both falling 
demand and contained supply. The latter effect can be seen as the interaction of the minimum wage 
policy with the unemployment insurance system that grants minimum-wage earners an unemployment 
beneﬁ  t close to their previous wage. In this context, the potential positive impact of the minimum wage 
increase on labor supply may be much more limited. The smaller probabilities of employment would 
translate into a wider income distribution. However, inequality may be reduced by the unemployment 
insurance system, even if at the cost of lower incentives to work.
These results highlight the need for a comprehensive policy, in which minimum wage increases take 
into account the evolution of productivity gains. A set of policies that increases the cost of labor and 
at the same time increases the protection of workers in unemployment is bounded to generate lower 
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